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'.:• * ^e No. 2007019* 
: uwer Court Case No. 044402268 
BR1EI Ol AP1M M 
COMES NOW Appellant, Uvia Swallow f.k.a l.ecui Kennard (also "Swallow" or 
S TA1 EMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter, pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 7 8 - ? a - V ? V V A ( 1 9 ^ as amended) . 
S1A1EML N1 OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. ^id the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's Motion to Set 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW. The trial court's denial or granting of a motion to set 
aside judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Lund v. Hall 938 P.2d 285,287 (Utah 
1997): Ostler v. Buhler. 957 P.2d 205,206 (UtahCt App. 1998): Butters v. Jackson. 917 P.2d 
87,88 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). No deference is accorded to the trial court's conclusions of law. 
Lund v. HalL 938 P.2d at 287. 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion, and wrongfully disregard the best 
interest of minor children, by entering an order effecting child support by 
default? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. The trial court's denial or granting of a motion to set 
aside judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Lund v. HalL 938 P.2d 285,287 (Utah 
1997): Ostler v. Buhler. 957 P.2d 205,206 (Utah Ct. App. 1998): Butters v. Jackson, 917 P.2d 
87,88 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). No deference is accorded to the trial court's conclusions of law. 
Lund v. HalL 938 P.2d at 287. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASE LAW 
There are no authorities, statutes or case law wholly determinative of the issues herein. 
This case hinges upon an interpretation of Rule 60(b) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case concerns whether Appellant's motion to set aside default judgment was 
correctly denied by the trial court. In addition, this case concerns whether the trial court 
could correctly make financial determinations as to child support within the default 
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judgment. The parties were divorced b\ a Decree entered March ~. 2 0 " in the Fourth 
District Court. On or about May 4 _i>r7. AppeV -.uihau nusoanc j liled a 
• • minute income to the Petitioner.'* Appellant 
iiiL'd an answer to that petition and a counterclaim on May 22, 2006.. On May 2: \ ; n n 6 , 
Appellant filed a verified repl) .- eimonei s counterclaim,, I lusband, an attoi;.^.\. ucied 
After May 2006, neither Appellant nor Appellee sought m- -ubmiited a proposed 
attorney planing order for discovery pursuant fo i ..
 4;,. . vn :v,.u L 
PRMI HMJRK Muslin ml Hi In I mi .riiiiir! KICM 1 petition In modify the dec;v-* '"divorce on June 12, 
2006. He did not receive leave of the court to file the amended petition until July 21, 2006. 
After Juh- 21 ?O06, neither party sought nor submitted a proposed * - .< • J 26 planning order. 
'•*•-' c i t€ ::! to sei \ • e Wife his reqi ic sts foi admissions, interrogatories, and 
requests for production of documents by mailing them to her counsel, Craig M. Bainum, on 
June 12, 2006. On July . . . *• \\ iic .ubmittec jn. answer to Husband's requests lor 
* • • • - • * • ' •
:
 nts. 
Meanwhile, ^u , I out July 1l)5 20oo, Appellee had iikd a "motion to compel petitioner 
to answer remaining requests for interrogatories and production of documents." !' ' Appellee's 
minium in i iiinnrl n.is mil ^lifipuilcd h\ ,i memorandum ofpoints and authorities of law until 
j iemhei 12. 20U(>. approx ima te ly two \2) m o n t h s later. An affidavit o f the Appe l l ee in 
support oi Ins m o u o n to compe l w a s aisc . ; , . » ;-,-. •. (2) mon tn - .. w 1, 
O! i Septen lbei 12 2006 
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On October 12, 2006, Appellee submitted a "notice to submit for decision" to the 
court regarding the pending motion to compel discovery. On October 16, 2006, the trial 
court entered an order on the motion to compel discovery, then entered a default against 
Appellant on November 13, 2006 for failure to comply with the October 16, 2006 order. 
The court's orders do not reflect that the court clerk mailed a copy of either order to 
Appellant's then-counsel, Craig M. Bainum. No hearing was ever requested by Husband nor 
held before Fourth District Court Domestic Relations Commissioner, Thomas R. Patton. 
On or about December 7, 2006, Husband filed an affidavit in support of a proposed 
default judgment, a notice to submit regarding application for entry of a default judgment, 
and he submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law and a default judgment amending 
the divorce decree. The Court signed the order on December 12, 2006. 
On January 8,2007, Wife's then-counsel, Craig M. Bainum, filed a motion to set aside 
the default judgment entered December 12,2006, together with an affidavit of Mr. Bainum 
which factually supported his claim that there had been inadvertence, mistake, and excusable 
neglect, in his failing to respond to the previous orders of the court. On January 30, 2007, 
Wife filed an answer to Husband's amended petition to modify the decree of divorce and 
filed a counterclaim. On February 1, 2007, the trial court entered an order denying the 
Wife's motion to set aside default judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Swallow and Kennard were divorced via a Decree of Divorce entered on March 7, 
2005 in the Fourth Judicial District Court in Utah County. (Appendix 1). As set forth in the 
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Decree of Divorce, the parties are the parents of six minor children, the oldest of whom was 
twelve (12) years of age when the orders in dispute in this appeal were entered. (Appendix 
i;f 2). 
Paragraph 8 of the decree of divorce set forth a child support award of $1,415.00 per 
month to be paid by Husband to the Wife. (Appendix 1; f 8). No alimony was awarded as 
between the parties, because both parties were found to be "able-bodied and capable of 
financially caring for their own needs." (Appendix 1; [^ 14). Moreover, paragraph 17 of the 
Decree of Divorce, entitled "property settlement," orders the Husband to pay $36,036.00 to 
Wife, payable in bi-weekly payments of $231.00 for a period of 72 months at zero percent 
interest. (Appendix 1; ^ f 17). Appellee was also ordered in the decree of divorce to hold 
Appellant harmless from the promissory note executed in favor of Wade and Dawnell 
Griffith in the approximate amount of $13,000.00, with payments due the Griffiths in the 
amount of $427.00 per month. (Appendix 1; 117). 
Paragraph 15 of the decree of divorce awards the parties' interest in real property, the 
"marital home," exclusively to the Appellant, along with all the equity therein, subject to a 
provision that she would either sell the real property or refinance the first mortgage in her 
name solely within five (5) years, or by March 2010. (Appendix 1; % 15). 
Paragraphs 8 and 14 of the Decree of Divorce set out contradictory terms as to the 
employment status of Appellant. Paragraph 8 finds that Wife "is unemployed" at the time 
of decree, whereas paragraph 14 finds that she was "able-bodied and capable of financially 
caring" for her own needs (apparently in spite of having custody of six young children). 
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(Appendix 1; If 8 & 14). This discrepancy can be resolved with reference to the trial court's 
factual findings, entered December 12, 2006, that at the time of the parties' divorce, it was 
contemplated that Swallow would begin working to support herself and the parties' children, 
and that she was known to have a bachelor's degree in elementary education with four years 
of full time teaching experience, as of the date of the Decree. (Appendix 2; % 3,4). 
On May 4, 2006, Husband filed a "verified petition to modify child support and 
impute income to the petitioner." (Appendix 3.) The Appellant filed an answer to that 
petition and a counter claim on May 22,2006. On May 25, 2006, Appellee filed a verified 
reply to the counterclaim. After the initial filing of Husband's petition to modify, neither the 
Appellee nor the Appellant sought, nor submitted a proposed attorney planning order for 
discovery pursuant to Rule 26 of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. NO planning order 
appears on the docket. (Appendix 3). 
At all time relevant to this appeal, Appellant was represented by an attorney, Craig 
M. Bainum. Appellee acted in a pro se capacity at all times relevant herein. Appellee is 
licensed as an attorney and counselor at law in Utah and is a member of the Utah County 
District Attorney's Office. (Appendix 4). 
On June 12,2006, Appellee filed an amended petition to modify the decree of divorce. 
Leave to amend the pleading was not granted by the trial court until July 21,2007. Appellant 
purported to serve the Appellant his requests for admissions, interrogatories and requests for 
production of documents via mail on the same day as he filed his amended petition to 
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modify, before he was given leave to do so, and months before Wife's answer was actually 
due on the amended petition. (Appendix 3). 
On July 27, 2007, one week after the trial court gave Appellee leave to amend his 
pleadings, Appellant submitted an answer to Appellee's requests for admissions, 
interrogatories, and request for production of documents. However, on July 19,2006 before 
he was given leave by the court to amend his pleadings, Appellee filed a motion to compel 
petitioner's answer to remaining requests for interrogatories and production of documents. 
This motion was not supported by any memorandum or affidavit of the Appellee. No 
supporting memorandum or affidavit pursuant to Appellee's motion to compel was filed for 
approximately two (2) months, until September 12, 2006. (Appendix 3). 
Appellee then filed a notice to submit for decision to the trial court on the pending 
motion to compel discovery on October 12, 2006. However, contrary to the RULES OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, and more particularly Rule 6-401, the matter was never 
submitted to the domestic relations commissioner for hearing. Despite the existence of an 
assigned domestic relations commissioner in the Fourth District Court (Patton), at no point 
were the parties allowed the opportunity, pursuant to Rule 6-401, to resolve the issues before 
the assigned commissioner nor did the assigned commissioner recommend a determination 
of the issues to the trial court judge. (Appendix 5). This matter never proceeded to 
mediation before a dispositive order was issued, as required by the mandatory domestic 
relations mediation provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-39. (Appendix 6). 
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Despite the absence of a planning order, and despite the case never being heard before 
the assigned commissioner, the trial court entered an order granting Appellee's motion to 
compel discovery on October 16, 2006. Pursuant to the order on the motion to compel, the 
trial court then entered a default judgment against Appellant on November 13, 2006 for 
failure to comply with the October 16,2006 order. This occurred as a "final order," despite 
the absence of mediation. Soon thereafter, the Appellant filed an affidavit in support of his 
proposed default judgment, and submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law. A default 
judgment amending the divorce decree was then entered on December 12,2006 based on the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by Appellee. (Appendix 7). Among other 
things, it reduced the total money amount to be paid to the Appellant, a custodial parent of 
six. 
On January 8, 2007, Appellant's previous counsel, Craig M. Bainum, filed a motion 
to set aside the default judgment, together with his affidavit factually supporting his claim 
that there had been inadvertence, mistake, and excusable neglect, in his failing to respond to 
the previous order of the trial court. (Appendix 8). Mr. Bainum asserted in his affidavit, and 
under oath, that he never actually received the relevant motions or orders leading up to the 
default entered against his client, including the court's order dated October 16, 2006, the 
notice to submit for entry of default on November 7, 2006 and the order of entry of the 
default on November 13,2006. He swore under an oath that he had not actually received any 
of these documents and did not have them in his office. He further represented that he had 
previously experienced problems with mail delivery in his office building, where the mail 
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had been mis-delivered among the numerous tenants in the building. In addition, Mr. 
Bainum testified that mail had previously been lost due to the vacancy of offices. Moreover, 
the court orders do not reflect that the trial court clerk ever mailed a copy of any order to Mr. 
Bainum. 
Appellee filed an objection to the motion to set aside the default judgment on January 
9, 2007 and then filed a notice to submit for decision on January 29, 2007. On January 30, 
2007, Appellant filed an answer to the Appellee's still-pending amended petition to modify 
the divorce decree, along with Appellant's counterclaim. 
The trial court entered a ruling on February 1, 2007 denying Appellant's motion to 
set aside the default judgment. This ruling was once again entered without being referred to 
the assigned district court commissioner for hearing as required by the mandatory domestic 
relations commissioner provisions of Rule 6-401 of the UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION, and without mediation. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A fundamental concern in this case is whether the trial court could properly rule on 
pending motions when the case has not followed the procedure outlined in UTAH CODE OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, Rule 6-401, requiring a hearing on domestic issues by a 
domestic relations court commissioner and when the case had not had mediation completed 
between the parties before a final order. In any event, the trial court abused its discretion 
when it denied Appellant's motion to set aside the default, entered without a hearing before 
the commissioner, where Appellant's counsel thoroughly outlined his inadvertence, mistake 
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and excusable neglect in not responding to the court order about Appellee's discovery 
requests. 
The net effect of the trial court's entry of default, and default order, based upon 
Appellee's findings of fact and conclusions of law, is to take away the Appellant's property 
settlement previously awarded to her in paragraph 17 of the Decree and to increase her child 
support obligation for six children by less than the property settlement taken away. This 
child support award was based upon Appellee's proposed finding of fact of a 30% "increase" 
in Appellant's income, despite the court's finding that the Decree already contemplated that 
same increase of Appellant's income in the calculation of the original decree of divorce. The 
total result of the trial court's order is a reduction Appellant's household revenue and 
reduction in her economic ability to care for the minor children by approximately $425.00 
per month. 
The trial court's orders modifying the property settlement in paragraph 17 of the 
decree of divorce were made despite inadequate findings of any substantial or material 
change in circumstances stated in the court record. Thus, were appellant to be granted relief 
from her default, she would have a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. Moreover, 
the trail court imputed a specific amount of income to Appellant without an adequate basis 
in the record to do so, and in complete disregard to Appellant's sworn answers to 
interrogatories, acknowledged in the court's findings, that the children really do have 
"special needs" and require special supervision, which impacts her employability. In 
addition, the court failed to make any finding regarding the efficacy of the Appellant's 
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employment, given the cost of daycare for six children aged twelve (12) and younger with 
"special needs," as it was required to do so by UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5. 
Appellant's previous attorney appropriately and timely filed a motion to set aside the 
default judgment based upon inadvertence, mistake, and excusable neglect, and supported 
such with his sworn testimony. Thus, substantial basis existed to have warranted a setting 
aside of the default judgment. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to set aside the 
default judgment entered under the totality of the circumstances. This is especially so, given 
the likely impact on the minor children. If Wife is relieved of the default, she has a 
likelihood of success on the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO 
GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, 
A. A Grant of Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Would Not 
Result in Substantial Injustice to Appellee. 
Rule 60(b) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE provides that default judgments 
may be set aside, if a motion to do so is made within three months of the entry of the default, 
and if the court finds there has been inadvertence, mistake, or excusable neglect, leading to 
the entry of the default. It is well settled by Utah law that, where any reasonable excuse is 
offered by a defaulting party, courts will favor granting relief from a default judgment, unless 
it appears that to do so would result in substantial injustice to the adverse party. 
Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor. 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 
1975). See also, Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin. 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (Utah 
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1962). Default judgments "are not favored in the law, especially where a party has timely 
responded with challenging pleadings. When that has been done, some caution should be 
observed to see that the party is not taken advantage of." Interstate Excavating v. Agla Dev. 
Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980). 
In the instant case, the trial court did not find that setting aside the default judgment 
would result in substantial injustice to the Appellee. There is no indication in the record that 
setting aside of the default judgment would result in substantial injustice to Husband. 
Moreover, no substantial injustice was alleged in Appellee's reply to the motion for relief 
from default. 
Furthermore, Appellant did reply to the trial court with challenging pleadings. 
Appellant timely filed an answer and counterclaim to Appellee's first petition to modify the 
decree of divorce on May 22, 2006. On June 12, 2006, Appellee filed an amended petition 
to modify. However, weeks before Appellant was even required to answer Appellee's 
amended petition, Appellee filed his motion to compel discovery and then his subsequent 
motion for default judgment based upon the court's order of October 12, 2006. It is 
important to note that Appellant did submit answers to Appellee's request for admissions, 
interrogatories, and requests for production of documents. However, due to inadvertence, 
mistake and excusable neglect, Appellant did not file additional answers after the court's 
order of October 12, 2006, all having to do with discovery. As sworn to by Mr. Bainum in 
his affidavit attached to Appellant's motion to set aside judgment, Appellant did not receive 
the Appellee's motion to compel nor any of the subsequent orders and default judgments in 
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the case, apparently due to problems with the mail delivery within her then-counsel's 
building. 
Upon learning of the default and order, Mr. Bainum attempted to file appropriate 
motions to set aside the default and to continue discovery for the purpose of fairness and 
justice in this case. In addition, Appellant also filed an answer and counterclaim to 
Appellee's amended petition to modify. Despite Mr. Bainum's efforts, the trial court denied 
the motion to set aside and upheld the previously entered default. All of this occurred when 
Wife's former counsel would reasonably have expected any motion in the case to be set for 
a hearing before Commissioner Patton, since the law mandates such. 
Thus, when the trial court denied Appellant's motion to set aside judgment, it did so 
without "cautiously observing the case and matter" to ensure that the Appellant was not taken 
advantage of. Interstate Excavating v. Agla Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980). The trial 
court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to set aside default judgment. 
B. The Trial Court's Denial of Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment Resulted in Substantial Injustice to Appellant. 
In determining whether to set aside a default judgment, Utah courts have uniformly 
acknowledged that the "policy of the law is to accord litigants the opportunity for a hearing 
on the merits, where that can be done without serious injustice to the other party." Interstate 
Excavating v. Agla Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980). Public policy and judicial 
practice generally indicate that trial courts should be indulgent toward permitting full inquiry 
and knowledge of disputes so they can be settled advisedly and in conformity with law and 
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justice. To that end, the courts are generally indulgent toward the setting aside of default 
judgments where there is a reasonable justification or excuse for the failure to appear or 
respond, and where timely application is made to set it aside. Consistent with this objective, 
where there is doubt about whether a default should be set aside, courts should resolve the 
doubt in favor of granting the relief, to the end that each party may have an opportunity to 
present his side of the controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance with law and 
justice. Id. at 371. This principal should be even more important in an equity action. It 
should be especially so in an equity action involving the welfare of minors. 
When faced with determining whether to grant or deny a motion 
to set aside a default judgement, a trial court should balance two 
valid considerations; on the one hand, to relieve the party of the 
judgment vitiates the effect of res judicata and creates a hardship 
for the successful litigant by causing him to prosecute more than 
once his action and subjecting him to the possible loss of 
collecting his judgment. On the other hand, the court desires to 
protect the losing party who has not had the opportunity to 
present his claim or defense. 
Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855, 858 (Utah 1979) (quoting Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. 
Parker. 513 P.2d 429, 431 (Utah 1973)). 
In the instant case, the court abused its discretion when denying Wife's motion to set 
aside default judgment. The trial court did not correctly or adequately balance both sides of 
the equation. First, had the trial court granted the motion to set aside, Appellee would not 
have experienced any real hardship. The time from when Appellee's petition to modify was 
filed to the date discovery began was not a long period. In fact, he began discovery quite 
prematurely, which Wife nevertheless answered. In addition, Appellee filed an amended 
-14-
petition around the same time as he served Appellant with his discovery requests. Again, he 
acted quite prematurely. Appellant subsequently submitted her answers to the initial 
discovery process, in approximately one month. Meanwhile, the Appellee had filed an 
amended petition without leave of the court. 
The trial court finally granted leave to amend. However, this grant was made after 
the subject discovery relating to the first petition. Really, there was no valid discovery on 
the amended petition pending at all when Husband wrongfully complained Wife was in 
default for failing to answer it. Thus, the case was still in great flux during the time that the 
motion to compel was granted and the Default Judgment entered. The motion to set aside 
was then completed in a timely fashion and within a short time frame, so as not to create a 
hardship for Appellee to continue with the case. 
On the other hand, the Appellant was utterly stripped of her opportunity to present her 
case by the trial court's denial of her motion to set aside default judgment. Although Wife 
had answered Appellee's petition to modify the decree of divorce and the discovery, she was 
not given the opportunity to present her defenses. Moreover, the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law submitted by Appellee and subsequently adopted by the trial court did not 
include sufficient facts to support a finding of the substantial change in circumstances needed 
to modify a decree of divorce. This would lead to the conclusion Husband was not really 
entitled to relief on the merits. The findings imputed a particular amount of income to the 
Appellant without a finding that such imputation was due to factors not contemplated at the 
time of the decree of divorce. More importantly, the default judgment substantially effected 
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the revenue Appellant had available to support the six minor children, including a previously 
ordered property settlement. In point of fact, the trial court decision eviscerated the common 
practice to ensure that "each party may have an opportunity to present his side of the 
controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance with law and justice." Interstate 
Excavating v. Agla Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980). 
The trial court's denial of Wife's motion to set aside default judgment resulted in 
substantial injustice to the Appellant, while a granting of the motion would not have 
disadvantaged Husband. The trial court failed to weigh the factors in this case, and therefore, 
abused its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to set aside default judgment. 
C. The Trial Court Improperly Found the Actions of Appellant's Counsel 
Did Not Qualify as Inadvertence, Mistake, or Excusable Neglect. 
Utah courts have held that "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," in 
accordance with a Rule 60(b) motion, may be found where documents were not properly 
forwarded as had been anticipated, and a default judgment had been entered. Classic 
Cabinets. Inc. v. All American Life Insurance Company, 978 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1999). 
In the instant case, Appellant's counsel filed an affidavit with the lower court, 
testifying to problems with receipt of mail in his office building, sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 60(b). The trial court found this to be an inadequate basis to support 
a motion to set aside, based upon a mere and rebuttable presumption in the law that items 
mailed are presumed to be served and are presumed to be received. Such a presumption 
regarding receipt of mailed items is rebuttable and certainly should not overcome a specific 
•16-
affidavit, from an attorney and officer of the court, swearing under oath that he had not 
actually received his mail in this case, and that he had specifically been having problems with 
receipt of mail generally in his office building. 
In addition to the problems with the mailed items, as testified to in his affidavit, other 
independent reasons exist in the record for the trial court to have granted the motion for relief 
from judgment. Specifically, the default was entered due to the Appellant's putative failure 
to answer discovery. This discovery was propounded, and answered (or partially answered), 
where no Rule 26 order had ever been submitted to the lower court. Under the plain terms 
of Rule 26, it was unlawful for Appellee to have ever propounded the requests for 
admissions, interrogatories and request for production of documents to Appellant in the first 
instance. Moreover, the issues were joined and both parties had a petition and counter 
petition pending. Therefore, Appellant may have legitimately believed the Appellee could 
not properly go forward with compelling discovery, which he was not authorized to 
propound it in the first place. Based on these factors, a finding of "inadvertence, mistake, 
or excusable neglect" is supported in the procedural record alone. 
Furthermore, contrary to proper procedure outlined in UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION, Rule 6-401, all motions in this case bypassed the domestic commissioner 
process, mandatory in the Fourth District, because that district has a commissioner. Motions 
went directly before the judge for consideration and for signature of orders without a 
commissioner hearing (or district court hearing). The Appellant may well reasonably have 
assumed that, since aU domestic matters must go first before the commissioner, this case, too, 
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would go before the commissioner before she could be defaulted, per procedure outlined in 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, Rule 6-401. Again, the procedural record alone 
supplies a basis to find excusable neglect. 
Finally, proper procedure outlined in UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, 
Rule 6-401, mandates mediation for resolution of aU domestic cases. Thus, it logically would 
fall within the meaning of inadvertence, mistake or excusable neglect, for the Appellant to 
believe the trial court would not sign a final judgment and order against her without the 
parties first submitting to mediation. Again, the procedural record alone supplies a basis to 
find excusable neglect. 
In this case, discovery was propounded unlawfully by Appellee, before any Rule 26 
order. Appellee should not have been permitted to go forward with the discovery in the first 
instance. Nonetheless, the Appellant answered the discovery. This history does not 
constitute a willful and utter disregard by the Appellant of her obligation to answer 
discovery. The issue before the trial court was much more subtle-whether or not the answers 
she supplied were sufficient. Further, Appellant had a right to assume, under the laws of the 
State of Utah and by reason of the existence of a domestic relations commissioner in the 
Fourth District Court, that she could not be defaulted, absent an actual hearing on the merits 
of the motion to compel before the district court commissioner, at which the motion to 
compel could be discussed in oral argument. She was never afforded such a hearing. 
Appellant had an absolute right under the laws of the State of Utah to assume that this case 
would not go forward to any final judgment, absent domestic relations mediation, which 
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never occurred, and which was never waived by the lower court. UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION, Rule 6-401. 
Under the totality of these circumstances, the default was based upon inadvertence, 
mistake and excusable neglect of the Appellant, and it was an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to ignore all these circumstances appearing on the record below. The trial court's 
denial of Appellant's motion to set aside has large ramifications to domestic law practice and 
the use of domestic relations commissioners. If this Court affirms the trial court's denial of 
Appellant's motion set aside judgment and allows the default judgment to stand without the 
court below following the proper procedure outlined in Rule 4-601, then it will effectively 
eviscerate the Rule. Moreover, such a rule would strip Rule 26 of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE of any real application in domestic cases. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DISREGARDED THE BEST 
INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN IN CHANGING AN AWARD OF CHILD 
SUPPORT BY DEFAULT. 
Usually, it is not appropriate in Rule 60(b), UTAH R. CIV. P., motions to examine the 
merits of the underlying claim decided by a default judgment (except to consider whether the 
defaulted party has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits). However, the Utah 
Supreme Court has previously reviewed and examined a judgment based on the merits where 
the judgment effects the rights and interests of a child. Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 
1984). In Larsen, the Court opined that, in these types of cases, any determinations have 
important consequences for the child in the future. In addition, the child is almost always 
unrepresented. Thus, the need for review and examination on the merits is necessary. 
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In the instant case, the trial court entered a default order of modification effecting 
what the trial court in its own default judgment now on appeal specifically found to be 
entirely in the nature of child support. Moreover, it did so in the face of proceedings where 
no guardian ad litem represented the interests of the minor children. Just as the Supreme 
Court envisioned in Larsen, without the children's interest being considered or represented, 
the impact of this decision had substantial consequences to the rights and interests of the 
children. The trial court failed to make the review and examination necessary to ensure the 
best interests of the children were protected. 
Appellant asserts that, when reviewing whether to set aside a default judgment, trial 
courts should to be more liberal when such judgments effect the interests of minor children. 
Utah statutes and case law are rife with the policy that a child's best interests should be 
considered when entering and enforcing family law orders. If there is a risk of an erroneous 
order regarding the support of minor children detrimental to those minors, public policy in 
the state of Utah favors a liberal view toward setting aside of such a default, much more 
strongly than it would favor relief in general civil litigation such as reflected by the 
Westinghouse decision, supra. 
If this Court were to affirm the trial court decision, the decision would fly in the face 
of public policy and result in substantial adverse consequences to the future rights and 
interests of these children, and other children in similar situations where they have no one 
representing them. 
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REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Appellant asserts that the actions of the Appellee in forcing the motion to compel 
despite his recently amended petition and lack of a Rule 26 order, as well as his objection to 
setting aside the default are not well taken. Wife should therefore, be awarded her attorney's 
fees on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgement and improperly disregarded the best interest of the minor children when 
setting child support within the default judgment. Based upon the foregoing, the Appellant, 
respectfully requests that Judge Howard's denial of Appellant's Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment be reserved and the case be remanded to set aside the judgment and consider the 
case on its merits. 
DATED THIS day of , 2007. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
Mary C. Corporon 
Allison R. Librett 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of , 2007,1 caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing to be [ ] mailed, postage prepaid, [ ] hand-delivered, [ ] 
transmitted via facsimile, to: 
RANDY KENNARD 
Appellee/Respondent 
478 South 1220 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney 
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DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 044402268 
Division: 
Judge: Fred D. Howard 
Pursuant to the Stipulation and the Court having reviewed the file in this matter and being fully 
advised in the premises and the Court having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and pursuant thereto, enters the following Decree of Divorce: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The Petitioner is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce against the Respondent upon the 
grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to become absolute and final upon the 
entry by the cleric of the Court. 
2. CHTTITRFN. There have been six (6) children born as issue or adopted, to wit: Sadie 
Jean Kennard born on June 6,1994, Jonathan William Kennard born on March 20,1996, 
Seattle Marie Kennard born on May 3,1997, Thomas Perth Kennard born on July 22, 
1998, Matthew Denmark Kennard born on August 25,2000, and Isaac Jensen Kennard 
bom on March 14,2001. 
1 3. JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS. Pursuant to the requirement of Rule 4-901 of the Code 
2 of Judicial Administration, upon information and belief, no proceedings involving the 
3 custody of the children have been filed in Juvenile. 
4 4. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT. Utah is the home state of said 
5 minorchildrenpursuantto§78-45c-3(l)(a)UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (as amended) 
6 in that: 
7 e. Utah is the home state of the minor children at the time of commencement of this 
8 proceeding. 
9 f. Said minor children resides with the Petitioner. 
10 g. The parties have not been a party, witness or participated in any other capacity 
11 in any other litigation concerning the custody of the subj ect minor children in this 
12 state or any other state. 
13 h. The parties have no information of any custody proceedings concerning the 
14 subject minor children in a court of this or any other state. 
15 i. The parties do not know of any person, not a party to these proceedings who has 
16 physical custody of the subject minor children and who claims to have custody 
17 or visitation rights with respect to said children. 
18 5. CHILD CUSTODY. The Petitioner and Respondent are fit and proper persons to be 
19 awarded the joint legal custody of the parties minor children. Petitioner and Respondent 
20 will have mutual decision making in education, medical and religious decisions. The 
21 Petitioner will have sole physical custody of all six (6) children. 
22 6. PARENT TIME. The Respondent shall be entitled to parenting time with the parties' 
23 minor children in accordance with the statutory guidelines and recommendations 
24 contained in Section 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5 of the Utah Code and the parties shall abide 
25 I by the provisions in Section 3 0-3-10.1 et. seq. See Attachment "A" attached hereto and 
incorporated herein. The Respondent will exercise his parent time under said statute by 
taking three (3) children the first weekend and by talcing the next three (3) children on 
his next weekend for one year. The Respondent will take all six (6) children for 
holidays. The Respondent will exercise his summer visitation for the year 2005, the first 
two (2) weeks of June. The Respondent will notify the Petitioner when he wishes to 
exercise his summer visitation three (3) months in advance of that visit 
CHANGES IN CUSTODY. It would be is in the best interests of their children, when 
they obtain age 16, to be allowed the opportunity to live with their father, the 
Respondent, on a permanent basis if they so desire; without the necessity of either party 
having to prove a change in circumstances or the children's best interest. The parties will 
work together to ensure that this option is not exercised in a manner that would be 
unreasonable. The exercise of this option will not require a court order modifying 
physical custody; but either party may petition the court to change custody according to 
the terms of this Order. j 
CHILD SUPPORT. Respondent's monthly child support obligation shall be in 
accordance to the parties' gross monthly incomes and the Uniform Child Support 
Guidelines contained in the statute. Petitioner is unemployed and Respondent earns a 
gross monthly income of $4,072.00. Therefore, child support shall be set at $1,415.00 
per month. Child Support shall be paid in bi-weekly increments until each child reaches 
the age of eighteen and graduates from high school, whichever occurs later. Child 
Support will automatically be reduced according the child support table when each child 
reaches 18 or graduates from high school. The Petitioner shall be entitled to receive 
child support by way of mandatory income withholding through the Office of Recovery 
Services if Respondent becomes thirty (30) days delinquent in his payment of child 
support. Each of the parties shall cooperate fully in providing the information to the 
Office of Recovery Services to effectuate the withholding procedure. See Attachment 
"B" attached hereto and incorporated herein. 
HEALTH, ACCIDENT AND DENTAL INSURANCE. Respondent will pay the entire 
premium for health insurance for the six (6) years of the property settlement, which is 
stated in paragraph 19 After the six (6) years, the parties will pay the health care 
premiums in accordance with the percentage each parent is contributing to child support 
according the most recent child support worksheet, up to the Petitioner paying 50% of 
the health care premium. 
MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES OF CHILD. The Court shall issue an Order in 
which both parents share equally in all uninsured routine medical and dental expenses, 
[including but not limited to one-half of expenses for surgery, orthodontic care, 
psychological or psychiatric care, hospitalization, physical therapy, ophthalmology and 
optometry, broken limbs, and continuing illnesses or allergies such as diabetes or asthma] 
as well as other reasonable and necessary uninsured medical and dental expenses, in 
accordance with §78-45-7.15, Utah Code Annotated (as amended). 
a. Either parent who incurs medical expenses for the parties * children shall provide 
written verification of the cost and payment of such medical expenses to the other 
parent within 30 days of payment 
b. In addition to any other sanctions provided by the Court, either parent incurring 
medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to 
recover the other parent's share of the expenses if the parent knowingly and 
willingly fails to comply with subparagraph a, as applicable. 
c. The non-incurring parent has (20) twenty days to reimburse the parent that 
incurred the out of pocket expense upon receipt of verification described in 
paragraph 12a. 
11. LIFE INSURANCE. It is reasonable and proper that the Petitioner and Respondent 
should maintain life insurance coverage on their own lives naming the each other as 
trustee for the benefit of the minor children in the amount of at least $ 100,000.00 if it is 
available through their employer at a reasonable cost for as long as the children are 
minors. 
12. WORK OR EDUCATION RELATED DAYCARE. Each party shall be ordered to pay 
one-half of any and all work related or education related daycare expenses incurred for 
the minor children. 
13. TAX EXEMPTIONS. During the six (6) years ofthe property settlement described in 
paragraph 19, Respondent will be able to claim all six (6) children as tax dependents, 
and he will split any refunds that he receives with the Petitioner 50/50. After the six (6) 
year property settlement period, the parties will claim the children as tax dependents in 
accordance with each persons percentage of contribution to child support for the children 
as stated on the current child support worksheet. If the percentage comes out to allow 
the Petitioner to claim part of a child the parties will round down to a whole child since 
the exemptions can not be split. 
14. ALIMONY. In consideration ofthe property settlement contained herein, the Petitioner 
hereby waives, forfeits and disclaims alimony or spousal support from the Respondent 
now and forever. Both parties are able-bodied and capable of financially caring for their i 
own needs. 
15. REAL PROPERTY. During the course ofthe marriage, the parties have acquired an 
interest in real property. It is fair and equitable that Petitioner be awarded the marital 
home as her sole and separate property on a permanent basis along with all equity 
therein. Petitioner will sell or refinance the first mortgage on the home in her name 
solely within five (5) years. Petitioner will be responsible for the first mortgage on the 
home, keep this debt current, and hold Respondent harmless from this debt. 
RETIREMENT. Petitioner waives any claim or interest that she would have in receiving 
part of Respondent's retirement and Respondent will be awarded his entire retirement 
that has accrued during the parties' marriage. 
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT. In addition to Respondent's waiver of an equity interest 
in the marital home, the Respondent shall pay the following as property settlement: 
Thirty-six thousand and thirty six dollars ($36,036.00) cash payable at the rate of 
$231.00 bi-weekly for a period of seventy-two months (156 payments); zero interest 
accruing if payments are timely, payments over thirty days late subject to the then 
existing pre-judgment rate of interest as provided by law. 
Respondent will assume and hold the Petitioner harmless from the promissory executed 
by the parties in favor of Wade & Dawnell Griffith; which note was executed by the 
parties to purchase the marital home and is now owing in the approximate amount of 
$13,000.00 with payments due in the amount of $427.00 per month. 
This property settlement shall not be dischargeable, reduced or modified by the 
Respondent in any way, including, but not limited to any bankruptcy proceeding. This 
amount is fixed and not adjusted in any manner for inflation or otherwise, without any 
interest accruing against said amount so long as the Respondent makes his regular 
monthly payments. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY. During the course of the marriage the parties have acquired / 
certain personal property that shall be awarded as it has already been divided between the 
parties. 
DEBT DIVISION. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired certain debt 
obligations that shall be divided as follows: 


























debt obligations incurred since the date of the parties separation in May 2004. 
b. Respondent shall assume and discharge and hold Petitioner harmless therefrom for the 
debt obligations owing to Respondent's student loans, Home Depot, RC Willey, and 
Chris Boudreau. 
20. SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES. It is reasonable and appropriate that if the parties are 
unable to resolve disputes, subsequent to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, that they 
will first attempt to resolve the dispute through a settlement conference before litigating 
their disagreements. 
21. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. Each party should assume*their own attorney's 
fees and costs. 
22. MISC. The parties shall be ordered to execute and deliver to the other party any and all 
certificates of title, bills of sale or other documents reasonably requested by the other 
party or ordered by the Court, to transfer title in personal property awarded in the 
divorce. 
DATED this / ^ a y of Fehniary, 2005. 
BY THE COURT 
^MiFtA/, 
T JUDGE DISTRICT CO 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this T7? day of Februaryt'ZOtfS, a copy of the 
foregoing to the following: 
Maria R. Snow 
Attorney for Petitioner 
765 North Main Street 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
ATTACHMENT "A 
NON-CUSTODIAL PARENT'S VISITATION SCHEDULE 
FOR CHILDREN 5 TO 18 YEARS OF AGE 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-35 
Reasonable visitation should be defined as the parents may agree. If they are not able to agree, 
then the non-custodial parent shall have -visitation with children 5 to 18 as follows: 
Midweek: One weekday evening specified from 5:30 p.m. or from the time child's school is 
regularly dismissed, until 8:30 p.m. 
Alternate Weekends: Fri 6:00 p.m. or from the time child's school is regularly dismissed 
on Fri to Sun 7:00 p.m. 
Holidays take precedence over ihe weekend visitation and weekend schedule does not change. 
Specified weekday and pickup time shall be stated in Order. 
Holiday Visitation: (6:00 p.m. day before hohday to 7:00 pjn. day of holiday unless specified 
otherwise) 
Odd Numbered Years Even Numbered Years 
Martin Luther King President's Day 
Fri 6:00 p.m. to Mon 7:00 pjn. Fri 6:00 p.m. to Mon 7:00 pm. 
Spring Break or Easter July 4th 
6:00 p.m. on day school lets out until 6:00 p jn. day before to 11:00 p.m. 
7:00 pan. on Sun before school day of hohday 
resumes Labor Day 
Memorial Day Fri 6:00 p.m. to Mon 7:00 p.nx 
Fri 6:00 p.m. to Mon 7:00 p.m. Columbus Day 
July 24th UEA weekend 
6:00 pjn. day before to 11:00 pjn. Weds 6:00 pan. tq?Sun7:00 p.m. 
day of hohday Child's actual birthday 
Veteran's Day 3:00 p.m. to 9:00 pan. 
Day before or after child's birthday Thanksgiving 
3:00 p.m. to 9:00p.m. Weds 7:00 p.m. to Sun 7:00 p.m. 
First half of Christmas vacation, including Second half of Christmas vacation, 
Christmas-Eve and Christmas Day to including Christmas Day 
1:00 p.m. 1:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. 
Father's Day: With Father 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. 
Mother's Day: With Mother 9:00 ajn. to 7:00 pjn. 
Summer: Four weeks during summer, or if year-round schooling, lA school breaks, 
including 2 weeks uninterrupted. Custodial parent allowed 2 weeks uninterrupted. Notification 
of summer visitation or vacation weeks with children should be provided in writing to other 
parent at least 30 days in advance. 
Telephone: Contact at reasonable hours. 
PARENT-TIME SCHEDULE FOR CHILDREN 
UNDER 5 YEARS OF AGE 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-35.5 
TOR CHILDREN UNDER 5 MONTHS: 
(1) Six hours per week preferably divided into 3 parent-time periods in the custodial home, 
established child care setting or other environment familiar to the child; and 
(2) Two hours on holidays and years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(f) through (i) 
preferably in the custodial home, the established child care setting or other 
environment familiar to the child. 
FOR CHUJDREN 5-10 MONTHS: 
(1) Nine hours of parent-time per week preferably divided into 3 parent-time periods in the 
custodial home, established child care setting or other environment familiar to the 
child; and 
(2) Two hours on holidays and years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(f) through (i) 
preferably in the custodial home, the established child care setting or other 
environment familiar to the child. 
FOR CHILDREN 10-18 MONTHS: 
(1) One eight hour visit per week; and 
(2) One three-hour visit per week; and 
(3) Eight hours on holidays and years specified in Subsections 30-3-35 (f) through (i); and 
(4) Brief phone contact at least two times per week during reasonable hours for a 
reasonable duration. 
FOR CHILDREN18 MONTHS TO 3 YEARS: 
(1) One weekday evening from 5:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.; and 
(2) Alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 
6:00 p.m. on Friday until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday; and 
(3) Parent-time on the holidays as specified in Subsections 30-5-35(c) through (i); and 
(4) With 30-day notice, extended paxent-time two one-week periods, separated by at least 
four weeks, with one week being interrupted, the other subject to parent-time by the 
custodial parent The custodial parent shall have an identical one-week period of 
uninterrupted vacation; and 
(5) Brief phone contact with the noncustodial parent two times per week during reasonable 
hours for a reasonable duration. 
FOR CHILDREN 3 YEARS OLD, BUT YOUNGER THAN 5 YEARS OLD. 
Same as 18 months to 3 years except extended parent-time is two two-week periods separated 
by at least 4 weeks, with one two-week period of uninterrupted parent-time. 
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FINDINGS OF FACTS & CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Re: Default Judgment 
Case No. 044402268 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
The above entitled matter having come before the Court pursuant to Rule 55 and 37 Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure upon Respondents application for default judgment m conjunction with 
the Courts previous Entry of Default against the Petitioner; and upon Petitioners non-compliance 
with ordered discovery; the Court having reviewed the file, the pleadings and affidavits filed 
therein; now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. Since the parties divorce decree was entered there have been substantial and unforseen 
changes of circumstances which have arisen such that the Court should modify the parties 
divorce decree to include: 
a. The Respondents income has increased to $5,718 dollars per month, an increase 
ofmorethan30%. 
b. The Petitioner has not sought employment since the divorce despite her ability to 
be employed. 
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c. The Petitioner is now remarried and has relocated with the parties children to San 
Angelo, Texas. 
d. The parties circumstances have changed such that it is equitable for the Court 
given the circumstances of the parties and the best interest of the children, to 
modify the parties divorce decree in relation to the payment of the monies under 
paragraph no. 17 of the divorce decree. 
The Court accepts as true and adopts herein as findings the statements of Respondent as 
contained in his Affidavit of Respondent in Support of Motion to Compel; and his 
Affidavit in Support of Motion for Default Judgment. 
Petitioner has a bachelors degree in elementary education and four years full-time 
teaching experience. 
At the time of the parties divorce it was contemplated that the Petitioner would begin 
working to support herself and the parties children. 
Petitioner presently has no intention to return to employment outside the home. 
A significant factor in why she has not returned to employment since the divorce has been 
her personal belief that a mother of minor children should not work outside the home. 
Petitioner has failed to comply with fhe Court's previous Order, Re: Motion to Compel 
wherein she was required to provide specific information to Respondent concerning what 
conditions would preclude her from employment despite being served with the Courts 
order. 
The Petitioner is voluntarily unemployed. 
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9. As per to the figures maintained by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/home.htm , of which the Court takes judicial notice, the 
current median annual wage of elementary teachers in Texas, where Petitioner now 
resides, is $41,980 dollars a year, or $3,498 per month. 
10. Income should be imputed to the Petitioner for child support purposes at $3,498 dollars 
per month. 
11. Based upon the parties incomes, the number of children, and the child support guidelines 
set forth in Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.14, Respondents child support obligation to 
the Petitioner should be increased to $1,445 per month, effective immediately. 
12. Paragraph no. 17 (a) of the divorce decree currently requires Respondent pay Petitioner a 
$36,036 cash settlement payable at the rate of $231 dollars bi-weekly for seventy-two 
months. 
13. Paragraph no. 17 (b) of the divorce decree currently requires the Respondent to pay on 
Petitioner's behalf approximately $427 dollars per month to Wade & Dawnell Griffith foi 
a debt associated with the purchase of the parties marital home which was awarded to the 
Petitioner in the divorce. 
14. The payment of monies under Paragraph no. 17 (b) is pursuant to a promissory note in 
both parties names which according to the regular payment schedule ordered in the 
divorce decree has $3,416 dollars left owing. 
15. What became provision no. 17 (a) and (b) of the divorce decree was incorporated into the 
divorce by stipulation and was intended by the parties to provide perceived necessary 
additional financial support for the Petitioner and the parties children; and was in no way 
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derivative of a division of any actual assets of the marriage. 
16. Although the payment of the monies in paragraph no. 17 (a) and (b) was entitled 
"property settlement53 in the divorce decree, these provision were in reality payments of 
support (i.e. alimony) to the Petitioner. 
17. The marital home awarded to the Petitioner in the divorce decree is currently valued at 
$195,786.00, with a mortgage amount owing of approximately $150,000 dollars leaving 
Petitioner equity in the amount of approximately $45,786.00. 
18. Since the parties divorce the Petitioner has remarried an active duty Lt. Coronel in the 
U.S. Air Force, stationed in at Goodfellow Air Force Base in San Angelo Texas. 
19. The Petitioner and her husband live off-base with the parties minor children in San 
Angelo, Texas. 
20. A Lt. Coronel in the U.S. Air Force is a pay grade 0-5 pursuant to the basic pay rates for 
U.S. military personnel. 
21. As per to the figures maintained by the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
http://www.dod.nuymilitarvpav/jiirleY t^Tr>1- of which the Court takes judicial notice, the 
Petitioner's household income from her current marriage, without considering any of 
Respondents payments to the Petitioner under the divorce decree, is the equivalent of 
$68,663 per year or $5,721 per month, with a significant tax advantage of only a taxable 
income of $20,858 per year, which raises the effective amount to $71,788 per year or 
$5,982 per month. 
22. When combined with Respondents child support payments as herein ordered that amount 
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rises to approximately $90,051 dollars per year or $7,504 dollars per month. 
23. Without relief from the Court as to the payment of the monies under paragraph no. 17 of 
the divorce decree, and without imputing income to the Petitioner, Petitioners household 
income would effectively rise to approximately $105,696 per year ($8,808 per month) 
while Respondents income after taxes would be approximately $2,500 dollars per month. 
24. The Petitioner has failed to provide specific information to the Respondent regarding her 
household income, expenses and debts despite the Courts Order, Re: Motion to Compel 
despite being served with the Courts order. 
25. The circumstances of the Petitioner and parties children have since changed due to 
Petitioners remarriage such that their standard of living, without the necessity of 
Respondents continued payments of the monies contained in paragraph no. 17 of the 
divorce decree, is greater than the standard of living the parties maintained while they 
were married. 
26. The Petitioner and the parties children are able to maintain a good standard of living 
without the additional payment of monies previously ordered under paragraph no. 17 of 
the divorce decree. 
27. In contrast the Respondent under the current terms of the divorce decree is unable to 
maintain the standard of living he enjoyed when the party were married. 
28. Because of Petitioner remarriage and the subsequent change in her and the children's 
financial circumstances, it is inequitable to require the Respondent to continue to pay to 
the Petitioner, or on her behalf, the monies contained in paragraph no. 17 (a) and (b) of 
the divorce decree and the Court should grant relief therefrom. 
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29. Petitioners relocation to Texas with the parties children has created a situation whereby 
the Respondent is limited in his ability to have regular visitation with the parties children 
due to the distances involved and Respondents limited financial ability. 
30. Given the current circumstances of the parties it is also not in the best interest of the 
children to require the Respondent to continue to pay to Petitioner, or on her behalf, the 
monies contained in paragraph no. 17 (a) and (b) of the divorce decree as it effects their 
need to have meaningful contact with their father in the future and his financial ability to 
effectuate the same. 
31. Furthermore the ancillary conditions related to Respondents payment of the monies 
contained in paragraph no. 17 of the divorce decree, the necessity of maintaining two 
jobs, or of leaving his current employment in attempts to earning more money from 
another occupation is not in the best interests of the children as it effects their continued 
regular receipt of the monies Respondent pays for child support; it being in their best 
interest in this respect that he remain in good standing in his current employment. 
32. Due to the changed circumstances caused by the Petitioner relocation, and based upon the 
financial circumstances of the parties, it is appropriate that the Petitioner should be 
responsible for the transportation costs associated with the Respondents annual summer 
visitation with the parties children; the dates of which are to be determined and arranged 
annually pursuant to guidelines set forth in Title 30, Chapter 3, Utah Code of Civil 
Procedure. 
33. It is also appropriate that in the event the children are in Utah ancillary to Petitioners 
purposes for any length of time in the future Respondent should be afforded reasonable 
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opportunity to have visitation with the children; said visits should not effect Petitioners 
responsibility to be responsible for the transportation costs associated with the 
Respondents annual summer visitation. 
34. The Court has previously entered it's Entry of Default against the Petitioner in relation to 
Respondent's Amended Petition to Modify Divorce Decree. 
35. There exists sufficient evidence in the record to enable the Court to enter a Default 
Judgment against the Petitioner, without the necessity of a hearing. 
36. Respondent would lilcewise be hampered in his ability to produce additional evidence at 
any subsequent hearing due to Petitioners failure to comply with this Courts Order, Re: 
Motion to Compel of which she has been served. 
37. There is good cause appearing in the record and the Court to grant Respondent the relief 
requested. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction. 
2. The Respondent has made actionable claims against the Petitioner in ins Amended 
Petition to Modify Divorce Decree. 
3. Respondent is entitled to a judgment of default against the Petitioner based upon her 
failure to provide a responsive pleading to his Amended Petition to Modify Divorce 
Decree. 
4. Respondent is entitled to a judgment of default against the Petitioner on account of her 
failure to comply with this Courts Order, Re: Motion to Compel. 
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BY THE COURT this /£ day of %&-£. , 2006. 
District Court Judge 
•**&*&&&£* 
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REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VITAL STATISTICS FEE 
Amount Due: 2.00 
Amount Paid: 2.00 













































REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: DIVORCE MODIFICATION 
Amount Due: 40.00 
Amount Paid: 40.00 
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Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 0.25 
Amount Paid: 0.25 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 0.75 
Amount Paid: 0.75 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 2.00 
Amount Paid: 2.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 0.25 
Amount Paid: 0.25 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 2.25 
Amount Paid: 2.25 
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1 1 - 0 2 
1 1 - 0 2 
1 1 - 0 2 
1 1 - 0 2 
1 1 - 0 2 
1 1 - 0 2 
11-02-
11-09-
•04 Filed: Petition 
•04 Commissioner PATTON assigned. 
•04 Filed: Verified Divorce Complaint 
•04 Fee Account created Total Due: 95.00 
•04 Fee Account created Total Due: 2.00 
•04 DIVORCE PETN Payment Received: 95.00 
Note: Code Description: DIVORCE PETN; Code Description: 
VITAL STATISTICS FEE 
04 VITAL STATISTICS FEE 
04 Filed return: Summons 
Party Served: 
Service Type: 








Service Date: November 04, 2004 
04 Filed: Answer 
RANDY KENNARD 
November 19, 2004 
04 Judge HOWARD assigned. 
04 Filed: Motion for Order to Show Cause 
04 Filed: Affidavit of Respondent in Support of Order to Show 
Cause 
11-24-04 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE scheduled on January 19, 2005 at 08:30 AM 
in Second Floor, Rm 2 02 with Judge HOWARD. 
11-29-04 Issued: Order to Show Cause Respondents 
Judge GARY D STOTT 
Hearing Date: January 19, 2 005 Time: 08:30 
11-30-04 Filed: Certificate of Service by Mailing 
12-06-04 Filed: Objection to Respondent's Order to Show Cause and 
Petitioner's Motion for Temporary Orders 
LECIA KENNARD 
12-06-04 Filed: Affidavit of Petitioner in Support of Petitioner's 
Motion for Temporary Orders 
01-18-05 Filed: Certificate of Completion of Divorce Ed. Class (Lecia 
Kennard-7/14/04) 
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01-19-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Order to Show Cause 




Petitioner's Attorney: MARLA R SNOW-SORENSEN 
Petitioner(s): LECIA KENNARD 
Attorney for the Respondent: MANDY S JENSEN 
Respondent(s): RANDY KENNARD 
Audio 
Tape Number: 05-2 202 Tape Count: 8:50-10:19 
HEARING 
TAPE: 05-2 202 COUNT: 8:50-
Parties appear with counsel and have reached a partial 
stipulation. Parties agree to be bound by the stipulation. Counsel 
also request mediation and settlement conference. 
Counsel present the respective arguments. The Court recesses in 
chamber off the record with counsel at 9:28am. 
Court resumes 10:12am. The Court finds and grants a Temporary 


















05 Filed: Financial Declaration 
05 Filed order: Order on Order to Show Cause 
Judge jrtaylor 
Signed February 11, 2005 
-05 Filed: Stipulation 
-05 Filed: Affidavit of Respondent in Lieu of Testimony 
-05 Filed: Child Support Obligation Worksheet 
-05 Filed: Child Support Affidavit [income verification attached] 
-05 Note: Location Information entered 
-05 Filed order: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Judge fhoward 
Signed March 07, 2005 
05 Judgment #1 Entered 
05 Filed judgment: Decree of Divorce 
Judge fhoward 
Signed March 07, 2005 
05 Case Disposition is Judgment 
Disposition Judge is FRED D HOWARD 
Fee Account created Total Due: 3.75 
COPY FEE Payment Received: 3.75 
Filed: Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel for Respondent / Mandy 
Jensen 
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Income to the Petitioner 
05-04-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 40.00 
05-04-06 DIVORCE MODIFICATION Payment Received: 
Note: Code Description: DIVORCE MODIFICATION 
05-04-06 Filed: 20 Day Summons [no proof of service] 
05-16-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.75 
05-16-06 COPY FEE Payment Received: 
05-22-06 Filed: Fee Only 
05-22-06 Filed: Answer to Verified Petition to Modify Child Support 














05-23-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 40.00 
05-23-06 DIVORCE MODIFICATION Payment Received: 40.00 
Note: Code Description: DIVORCE MODIFICATION, Mail 
Payment; 






05-25-06 Filed return: 20 Day Summons 
Party Served: KENNARD, LECIA 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: May 04, 2 006 
05-25-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.25 
05-25-06 COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.25 
Note: 1.00 cash tendered. 0.75 change given. 
06-01-06 Filed: Amended Reply to Petitioner's Counter-Claim Paragraph 
No. 2 
06-12-06 Filed: Amended Petition to Modify Divorce Decreee 
06-12-06 Filed: Motion to Amend Petition to Modify Divorce Decree 
06-12-06 Filed return: Certificate of Service of Respondent's Request 
for Admissions Interrogatories and Production of Documents 
Party Served: Craig Banium 
Service Type: Mail 
Service Date: June 12, 2 006 
06-12-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.25 
06-12-06 COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.25 
07-19-06 Filed: Motion to Compel Petitioner to Answer Remaining Request 
for Interrogatories & Production of Documents 
07-19-06 Filed: Notice That Respondent's Requests for Admissons Deemed 
Admitted 
07-19-06 Filed: Notice to Submit Re: Motion to Amend Petition Modify 
Divorce Decree 
07-21-06 Filed order: Order Granting Leave to Amend Petition to Modify 
Divorce Decree 
Judge fhoward 
Signed July 21, 2006 
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July 24, 2006 
09-12-06 Filed: 20 Day Summons [mailed to Petitioner's counsel] 
09-12-06 Filed: Motion for Leave to File Overlength Memorandum in 
Supoprt of Motion to Compel 
09-12-06 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Answers to 
Requested Discovery 


































Fee Account created 
06 COPY FEE 
06 Fee Account created 
06 COPY FEE 
06 Filed: Notice to Submit For Decision 
06 Filed order: Order Re: Motion to Compel 
Judge fhoward 
Signed October 16, 2 006 
06 Filed: Certificate of Service Re: Order Re: Motion to Compel 
06 Filed return: Certificate Of Service (Mailed To C Bainum) 
Party Served: KENNARD, LECIA 
Service Type: Mail 
Service Date: September 12, 2006 
06 Filed: Notice to Submit Re: Entry of Default 
06 Note: Default Certicate has been submitted and sent to the 
judge 
06 Filed: Entry of Default 
06 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.25 
06 COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.25 
06 Filed: Certificate of Service Re: Entry of Default 
06 Filed: Application for Entry of Default Judgment 
Filed: Motion for Leave to File Overlength Memorandum in 
Support of Default Judgment 
Filed: Affidavit in Support of Default Judgment 
Filed: Notice to Submit Re: Application for Entry of Default 
Judgment 
06 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.75 
06 COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.75 
06 Filed: Notice of Address Change 
06 Filed order: Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law 
Judge fhoward 
Signed December 12, 2006 
06 Filed order: Default Judgment Re: Amended Petition to Modify 
Divorce Decree 
Judge fhoward 
Signed December 12, 2006 
06 Fee Account created Total Due: 2.00 
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1 2 - 1 3 - 0 6 
1 2 - 1 3 - 0 6 
0 1 - 0 8 - 0 7 
0 1 - 0 8 -
0 1 - 0 8 -
0 1 - 0 9 -
0 1 - 0 9 
0 1 - 0 9 -
0 1 - 1 1 -
0 1 - 1 6 -
0 1 - 2 9 -
0 1 - 3 0 -
0 1 - 3 0 -
- 0 7 
0 1 - 3 0 - 0 7 
0 1 - 3 1 
0 1 - 3 1 
0 2 - 0 1 - 0 7 
Note: 20.00 cash tendered. 18.00 change given. 
Filed return: Certificate of Service of Default Judgement 
Party Served: C. M. Bainum 
Service Type: Mail 
Filed return: Certificate of Service of of Application for 
Entry of Default Judgement and Notice to Submit, Affidavit in 
Support of Default Judgement and Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Default Judgement 
Party Served: C M . Bainum 
Service Type: Mail 
Service Date: December 11, 2006 
Filed: Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgement 
07 Filed: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgement 
07 Filed: Affidavit of Craig M. Bainum 
07 Filed: Verified Objection Re: Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment 
Fee Account created Total Due: 0.25 
07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.25 
Note: 1.00 cash tendered. 0.75 change given. 
Filed: Supplemental Information Re: Objection to Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgement 
Filed: Exparte Application for Leave to File Over Length 
Memorandum Re Verified Objection, Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment & Supplemental Information Document 
Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision 
07 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision 
07 Filed: Answer to Amended Petition to Modify Divorce Decree and 
Counter-claim 
LECIA KENNARD 
January 30, 2007 
Filed: Reply to Respondent's Objection to Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgement 
Fee Account created Total Due: 2.25 
07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 2.25 
Note: 3.00 cash tendered. 0.75 change given. 
Filed order: Ruling Re: Petitioner's Motion to Set Aside 







& Conclusions of Law 
Judge fhoward 
Signed February 01, 
02-01-07 Filed order: Findings of Fact 
Judge fhoward 
Signed February 01, 2007 
02-01-07 Filed order: Order Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
Judge fhoward 
Signed February 01, 2007 
02-01-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 4.00 
02-01-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 4.00 
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03-01-07 Filed: Notice of Appeal mykeld 
03-01-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 205.00 mykeld 
03-01-07 APPEAL Payment Received: 205.00 mykeld 
Note: Code Description: APPEAL, Mail Payment; 
03-01-07 Bond Account created Total Due: 3 00.00 mykeld 
03-01-07 Bond Posted Payment Received: 300.00 mykeld 
Note: Mail Payment; 
03-05-07 Note: Notice of Appeal Sent Via State Mail Tracking #5550031607jenniag 
03-07-07 Note: Appealed: Case #20070198 dpx 
03-08-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 2.00 sunnya 
03-08-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 2.00 sunnya 
03-09-07 Filed: Copy of Letter from Court of Appeals dated 3-8-07 to Ms. 
Corporon -- Notice of Appeal has been filed with Court of 
Appeals (20070198) jenniag 
03-19-07 Filed: Certificate in Re Transcripts emilyp 
Printed: 03/23/07 14:14:10 Page 9 (last) 
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UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
Provo 
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Rule 6-401. Domestic relations commissioners. 
Intent: 
To identify the types of cases and matters commissioners are authorized to hear, to 
identify the types of relief commissioners may recommend and to identify the types 
of final orders commissioners may issue. 
To establish a procedure for judicial review of commissioners' decisions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall govern all domestic relations court commissioners serving in the 
District Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Types of cases and matters. All domestic relations matters filed in the district 
court in counties where court commissioners are appointed and serving, including 
all divorce, annulment, paternity and spouse abuse matters, orders to show cause, 
scheduling and settlement conferences, petitions to modify divorce decrees, 
scheduling conferences, and all other applications for relief, shall be referred to the 
commissioner upon filing with the clerk of the court unless otherwise ordered by the 
Presiding Judge of the District. 
(2) Authority of court commissioner. Court commissioners shall have the following 
authority: 
(2)(A) Upon notice, require the personal appearance of parties and their counsel; 
(2)(B) Require the filing of financial disclosure statements and proposed settlement 
forms by the parties; 
(2)(C) Obtain child custody evaluations from the Division of Family Services 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 62A 4 106, or through the private sector; 
(2)(D) Make recommendations to the court regarding any issue, including a 
recommendation for entry of final judgment, in domestic relations or spouse abuse 
cases at any stage of the proceedings; 
(2)(E) Require counsel to file with the initial or responsive pleading, a certificate 
based upon the facts available at that time, stating whether there is a legal action 
pending or previously adjudicated in a district or juvenile court of any state 
regarding the minor child(ren) in the current case; 
(2)(F) At the commissioner's discretion, and after notice to all parties or their 
counsel, conduct evidentiary hearings consistent with paragraph (3)(C) below; 
(2)(G) Impose sanctions against any party who fails to comply with the 
commissioner's requirements of attendance or production of discovery; 
(2)(H) Impose sanctions against any person who acts contemptuously under Utah 
Code Section 78 32 10; 
(2)(l) Issue temporary or ex parte orders; 
(2)(J) Conduct settlement conferences with the parties and their counselin a 
domestic relations case. Issues that cannot be settled shall be certified to the 
district court for trial; and 
(2)(K) Conduct pretrial conferences with the parties and their counsel on all 
domestic relations matters unless otherwise ordered by the presiding judge. The 
commissioner shall make recommendations on all issues under consideration at the 
pretrial and submit those recommendations to the district court. 
(3) Duties of court commissioner. Under the general supervision of the presiding 
judge, the court commissioner has the following duties prior to any domestic matter 
being heard by the district court: 
(3)(A) Review all pleadings in each case; 
(3)(B) Certify those cases directly to the district court that appear to require a 
hearing before the district court judge; 
(3)(C) Except in cases previously certified to the district court, conduct hearings 
with parties and their counsel for the purpose of submitting recommendations to the 
parties and the court; 
(3)(D) Coordinate information with the juvenile court regarding previous or pending 
proceedings involving children of the parties; and 
(3)(E) Refer appropriate cases to mediation programs if available. 
(4) Prohibitions. 
(4)(A) Commissioners shall not make final adjudications of domestic relations 
matters. 
(4)(B) Commissioners shall not serve as pro tempore judges in any matter, except 
as provided by Rule of the Supreme Court. 
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30-3-39. Mediation program. 
(1) There is established a mandatory domestic mediation program to help reduce the time and 
tensions associated with obtaining a divorce. 
(2) If, after the filing of an answer to a complaint of divorce, there are any remaining contested 
issues, the parties shall participate in good faith in at least one session of mediation. This requirement 
does not preclude the entry of pretrial orders before mediation takes place. 
(3) The parties shall use a mediator qualified to mediate domestic disputes under criteria 
established by the Judicial Council in accordance with Section 78-3 lb-5. 
(4) Unless otherwise ordered by the court or the parties agree upon a different payment 
arrangement, the cost of mediation shall be divided equally between the parties. 
(5) The director of dispute resolution programs for the courts, the court, or the mediator may excuse 
either party from the requirement to mediate for good cause. 
(6) Mediation shall be conducted in accordance with the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative 
Dispute Resolution. 




Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






: DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
: Re: Amended Petition to Modify Divorce 
: Decree 
• Case No. 044402268 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
The above entitled matter having come before the Court pursuant to Rule 55 Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure upon Respondents application for default judgment in conjunction with the 
Courts previous Entry of Default against the Petitioner; the Court having previously made and 
entered it's findings of facts and conclusions of law; and otherwise being fully advised in the 
premise, NOW HEREBY ORDERS AND DECREES that the above entitled divorce decree 
dated March 7,2005 is modified as follows: 
1. Respondents child support obligation to the Petitioner is increased to $1,445 per 
month effective immediately; to continue to be paid bi-weekly as specified in the 
divorce decree. 
2. Income is imputed to the Petitioner for purposes of child support at $3,498 dollars 
per month. 
3. Respondent's previous obligation to pay Petitioner $231 dollars bi-weekly under 
paragraph no. 17 (a) of the divorce decree is hereby terminated. 
Page 1 of 2 
4. Petitioner shall pay the remaining balance of approximately $3,416 dollars left 
owing under the parties promissory note referenced in paragraph no. 17 (b) of the 
divorce decree prior to the October 2007 due date. 
5. The Petitioner shall be responsible for the transportation costs associated with the 
Respondents annual summer visitation with the parties children; the dates of 
which are to be determined and arranged annually pursuant to guidelines set forth 
in Title 30, Chapter 3, Utah Code of Civil Procedure. 
6. In the event the children are in Utah ancillary to Petitioners purposes for any 
length of time in the future Respondent shall be afforded reasonable opportunity 
to have visitation with the children; said visits shall not effect Petitioners 
responsibility to be responsible for the transportation costs associated with the 
Respondents annual summer visitation. 
BY THE COURT this / ^ day of December, 2006. 
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Craig M. Bainum, 5913 
PO Box 920 
Sandy, Utan 84091 
(801) 565-9136 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 






AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG M. BAINUM 
Case Number 044402268 
Judge Howard (Division 5) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
:ss 
Craig M. Bainum, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Utah. I am the attorney 
of record for the Petitioner in this action and I have personal knowledge of the facts stated 
herein, except where otherwise indicated. 
2. The building where my office is located (43 West 9000 South) usually contains 
six occupants: my offices, a mediation firm; two loan companies, a loan processing company, 
and a title company. 
3. Our mail is delivered to a large mail box, with individual smaller slots for each 
occupant. I have been in this office since October 2004. During that time, the mail carriers 
occasionally put the wrong mail in the wrong individual smaller slots. When this happens, it 
has been the practice of each occupant to deliver any mail that belongs to another tenant to that 
tenant. 
4. I recently received a number of documents from the Respondent indicating that 
the default had been entered. Checking with the Court's docket, I found that there were a 
number of documents that I have not received, including the following: 
a. This court's order dated October 16, 2006; 
b. Notice to Submit Re: Entry of Default dated November 7, 2006; 
c. Entry of Default dated November 13, 2006; 
5. I first double-checked to see if we had received any of these pleadings, 
considering it a possibility that we had them but they had slipped through without my seeing 
them. We have none of these in the file. 
6. Then, I spoke to my secretary to ask if we are still getting mail from the other 
tenants in the building that was mistakenly delivered to them. She said that we were not 
getting much any more, though we are still getting mail for the other tenants. We discussed it 
further and realized that he have not been getting any of our mis-delivered mail since the title 
company moved out a couple of months ago. 
7. To be sure that I will be getting all of my mail in the future, I have obtained a 
Post Office box and will be using that as my mailing address in all cases from now on. 
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Dated this 
- ^ 
day of January, 2007. 
\JWvy 
cA day of January, 2007 personally appeared before me Craig M. Bainum 
who, being by me first duly sworn, declared/mat he is the person who signed the foregoing 
On this 






TINA L. MASTERS 
NOTARY PUBUC -STATE of UTAH 
5542 JOSHUA CIRCLE 
WEST JORDAN UT 84084 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 06-02-2009 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this date a trae and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
CRAIG M. BAINUM was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Randy Kennard 
478 South 1220 West 
Provo, UT 84606 
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